Reserve costs allocation model for energy and reserve market simulation by Pinto, Tiago et al.
Reserve Costs Allocation Model for Energy and 
Reserve Market Simulation  
Tiago Pinto1,2, Amin Shokri Gazafroudi1, Francisco Prieto-Castrillo1, Gabriel Santos2, Francisco Silva2,  
Juan Manuel Corchado1, Zita Vale2 
1BISITE research group – University of Salamanca 
Calle Espejo, s/n, 37007, Salamanca, España  
{tpinto, shokri, franciscop, corchado}@usal.es 
2GECAD – Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced Innovation and Development, 
Institute of Engineering – Polytechnic of Porto (ISEP/IPP) 
Rua Dr. António Bernardino de Almeida, 431, 4200-072 Porto, Portugal 
{gajls, fspsa, zav}@isep.ipp.pt 
  
Abstract—This paper proposes a new model to allocate reserve 
costs among the involved players, considering the characteristics 
of the several entities, and the particular circumstances at each 
moment. The proposed model is integrated in the Multi-Agent 
Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM), 
which enables complementing the multi-agent simulation of 
diverse electricity market models, by including the co-simulation 
of energy and reserve markets. In this context, the proposed 
model allows allocating the payment of reserve costs that result 
from the reserve market. A simulation based on real data from 
the Iberian electricity market – MIBEL, is presented. 
Simulation results show the advantages of the proposed model in 
sharing the reserve costs fairly and accordingly to the different 
circumstances. This work thus contributes the study of novel 
market models towards the evolution of power and energy 
systems, with the objective of adapting current and future 
models to the new paradigm of high renewable energy 
generation penetration. 
Index Terms—Electricity markets, MIBEL, Multi-Agent 
simulation, Reserve costs allocation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the massive introduction of renewable based 
generation in power systems, electricity markets are 
undergoing profound transformations [1]. These changes aim 
to cope with the particular characteristics of renewable 
generation (namely the variation due to their dependency on 
natural resources) and to promote the increase of an active 
participation from the consumers’ side. Such changes, 
however, turn the electricity market sector into a highly 
demanding and complex environment [2]. In order to cope 
with this evolving, complex and dynamic reality, electricity 
market simulators are being increasingly used as a promising 
solution to enable the involved players gaining experience to 
act in the frame of a changing economic, financial, and 
regulatory environment. There are several experiences that 
sustain that a multiagent system with adequate simulation 
abilities is suitable to simulate electricity markets [3-6], 
considering the complex interactions between the involved 
players. Some reference examples of electricity market 
simulators are AMES (Agent-based Modeling of Electricity 
Systems) [3], EMCAS (Electricity Market Complex Adaptive 
System), [4] and MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of 
Competitive Electricity Markets) [5, 6]. These are important 
contributions but, in general, lack flexibility as they adopt a 
limited number of market models and of players’ 
methodologies. One of the most relevant limitations refers to 
the study and analysis of reserve markets, and their connection 
with energy markets, especially considering the current and 
future scenario of high renewable generation penetration. In 
this scope, a relevant unsettled question is determining who 
should pay for the reserve costs. 
In the literature, different works that propose models to 
allocate reserve costs have been presented. In [7], a method 
has been proposed to obtain optimal bidding of operating 
reserves in the sequential market clearing of the Spanish 
electricity market. The flexible Expected Energy Not Supplied 
(EENS) criteria and the load point reliability of customers 
have been presented to allocate the reserves, respectively in 
[8] and [9]. In [10], authors present the reserve cost allocation 
method through market agents based on the desired reliability 
level of electrical consumers. In [11], the reserve costs have 
been allocated between Distribution Companies (DisCos) 
based on their Value Of Lost Load (VOLL). A mechanism has 
been presented to determine the operating reserve and 
apportion the reserve costs between electrical customers and 
Generator Companies (GenCos) in [12]. In [13], a novel 
mechanism based on a decentralized approach has been 
introduced to allocate reserve costs between consumers, 
generating units and system operator in the simultaneous 
energy and reserve market clearing problem. 
Moreover, different countries use different methods to 
allocate reserve costs. For example, in the UK electricity 
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market, both GenCos and the electrical consumers are charged 
for reserve costs [14]. However, GenCos are in charge of 
paying the reserve costs in some electricity markets (e.g. 
Austria, Netherlands and Singapore) [15-17]. On the other 
hand, allocating the reserve costs between GenCos can affect 
negatively on the electrical consumers because GenCos 
increase their corresponding energy price to compensate their 
loss of reserve cost. Therefore, in Switzerland and most of the 
electricity markets in the world, the demand-side participants -
consumers or DisCos - oversee paying the reserve costs [18].  
In this paper, a new method is proposed to allocate reserve 
costs between electrical customers, to support reserve market 
integration with day-ahead spot, intra-day and balancing 
markets. The proposed model is integrated in the MASCEM 
electricity market simulator, and its impact on the reserve 
market is studied. For this, a simulation scenario comprising 
real data from the Iberian electricity market – MIBEL [19] is 
generated. The simulation considers the day-ahead spot 
market, the intra-day market, and finally a reserve market, 
from which results the reserve price based on the total amount 
on EENS. The proposed reserve costs allocation model is then 
applied to determine who should pay for the reserve costs. 
After this introductory section, section II presents an 
overview of MASCEM and section III describes the electricity 
market models that are used in this study. Section IV presents 
the proposed reserve costs allocation model formulation, and a 
case study is presented in section V to validate and assess the 
achieved results. Finally, section VI discusses the most 
relevant conclusions from this work.  
II. MASCEM SIMULATOR 
The MASCEM simulator has recently been restructured 
[6], among many reasons, in order to guarantee the 
compliance with the FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical 
Agents) standards [20], allowing the integration with external 
platforms. FIPA is devoted to develop and promote open 
specifications that support interoperability among agents and 
agent-based applications [20]. Multi-agent systems using 
FIPA’s standards should be able to interoperate, however, it 
does not mean that the agents are able to share useful 
information due to the employment of different ontologies. 
Coping with FIPA standards meant implementing 
MASCEM’s agent society in JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment 
Framework) [21], a development framework that simplifies 
the implementation of multi-agent systems, and supports the 
majority and most important FIPA specifications. This way 
MASCEM is able to interact with other multi-agent systems 
using a common language. However, so that messages and all 
the concerned concepts can be understood by different 
systems it is also necessary that they share a common 
vocabulary and semantics. To this end, ontologies are used, 
enabling the standardization of communications and 
interpretation of concepts between independent systems. 
MASCEM includes only five different types of agents, 
besides the ones provided by JADE to control the user 
interfaces, and to manage communications, much like the 
previous version facilitators. The five agent types are: 
• Main Agent – enables the user’s interaction with the 
system. It is responsible for starting the market entities from 
the input file or user’s interface; for converting the input data 
into the respective RDF knowledge bases and for sending 
them to the respective players and operators; for distributing 
the various agents by the machines available for the 
simulation, considering the machines’ features and the agents’ 
processing needs; and for properly killing the agents when the 
user decides to terminate the application; 
• MIB Agent – it is responsible for reading the 
management information base of each machine, creating a 
report and sending it to the Main Agent so that it can decide 
which agents will move to each machine; 
• Market Operator – regulates pool negotiations by 
validating and analysing the players’ bids depending on the 
type of negotiation, and determines the market price, the 
accepted and refused bids, and the economical dispatch that 
will be sent to the system operator; 
• System Operator (ISO) – examines the technical 
feasibility from the power system point of view and solves 
congestion problems that may arise. It is responsible for the 
system's security as well as to assure that all conditions are 
met within the system; 
• Player – represents buyer, seller or aggregator agents. 
On one hand, it may be a consumer or distribution company 
which participates in the EM in order to buy certain amounts 
of power. On the other hand, it may simulate electricity 
producers or other entities able to sell energy in the market, or 
even aggregations of several entities. 
These core agents allow a simple, yet effective electricity 
market simulation. More complex and advanced simulation 
studies are achieved through the collaboration between the 
different multi-agent systems, as presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Collaboration between MASCEM and other multi-agent systems, 
from [6] 
Regarding the market models, MASCEM allows the 
simulation of several market types: day-ahead pool 
(asymmetric or symmetric, with or without complex 
conditions), bilateral contracts, balancing market, forward 
markets and ancillary services. Hybrid simulations are also 
possible as a combination of the different market models. 







Simulation scenarios in MASCEM are automatically 
defined, using the Realistic Scenario Generator (RealScen) 
[22]. RealScen uses real data that is available online, usually 
in market operators’ websites. The gathered data concerns 
market proposals, including quantities and prices; accepted 
proposals and established market prices; proposals details; 
execution of physical bilateral contracts; statement outages, 
accumulated by unit type and technology; among others. By 
combining real extracted data with the data resulting from 
simulations, RealScen offers the possibility of generating 
scenarios for different types of electricity markets. Taking 
advantage on MASCEM’s ability to simulate a broad range of 
different market mechanisms, this framework enables users to 
consider scenarios that are the representation of real markets 
of a specific region; or even consider different configurations, 
to test the operation of the same players under changed, 
thoroughly defined scenarios [22]. When summarized, yet still 
realistic scenarios are desired (in order to decrease 
simulations’ execution time or facilitate the interpretation of 
results), data mining techniques are applied to define the 
players that act in each market. Real players are grouped 
according to their characteristics’ similarity, resulting in a 
diversity of agent types that represent real market participants. 
MASCEM is also integrated with AiD-EM (Adaptive 
Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a 
decision support system that supports players decisions in 
their market negotiations. The AiD-EM system has been 
developed with the purpose of providing decision support to 
electricity market negotiating players. This system is 
composed by several distinct and independent decision 
support systems, each directed to the resolution of different 
specific problems. ALBidS (Adaptive Learning Strategic 
Bidding System) [23-25] focuses on the support of market 
players’ decisions when participating in auction-based 
markets. The participation in bilateral contract negotiation is 
supported by yet another multi-agent-based decision support 
system – DECON (Decision Support for Energy Contracts 
Negotiations) [26]. The multiagent approach of AiD-EM 
facilitates the interactions between the different components 
and also the communication with external agents, such as 
market players that make use of the decision support.  
III. REGULATORY ELECTRICITY MARKET MODELS 
As a result of the constant evolution of the electricity 
market environment, and the inclusion and change in the 
operation and players’ participation in the market, it became 
imperative for professionals in the area to entirely understand 
the markets’ principles and how to evaluate their investment 
under such a competitive environment. The shared interest of 
regulators and market players in foreseeing market behaviour 
required a clear understanding of market principles, and the 
impact of power systems physics on market dynamics and 
vice-versa [2, 27]. Additionally, a suitable understanding of 
the diversity of market types and regulatory models that have 
been introduced is critical for the success of involved players. 
The typical electricity market environment in Europe 
usually consists of a day-ahead pool (symmetric or 
asymmetric) where energy for the following day is negotiated. 
Typically, a floor for bilateral contracts is also considered 
[28]. Moreover, intraday markets are required to provide the 
means to renegotiate the previously traded power in order to 
meet the required adjustments towards the feasibility of the 
daily program and of the last scheduling [29]. Given the 
different market opportunities, each market player must decide 
whether to, and how to, participate in each market type. 
In addition to players (the buyers and sellers who negotiate 
in the market), these markets also include the market and 
system operators. The market operator is the entity responsible 
for operating the market. It manages the pool by using a 
market-clearing tool which establishes the market price for 
each trading period and the accepted and refused selling and 
buying bids. On the other hand, the system operator is the 
entity responsible for the management of the transmission grid 
and its technical constraints. After the establishment of a 
contract, the agreement is communicated to the system 
operator, which analyses its technical feasibility in the power 
system perspective; regardless of it being established through 
bilateral contracts or through the pool. 
A. Symmetric pool  
In the symmetric pool the market price definition is based 
on a double auction mechanism, being therefore characterized 
by a competition between buyer and seller agents. This means 
that, in this type of pool, both buyers and sellers submit bids. 
The market operator orders the supply and demand offers: 
the supply bids are sorted from the lowest price to the highest; 
and the demand bids are arranged from the highest price to the 
lowest. Hereinafter, the submitted bids compose the supply 
and demand step curves, and the market price is determined at 
the point in which both curves intersect. The market price is 
the value per MWh that each accepted consumer must pay to 
the respective supplier. The supply bids offering prices lower 
than the established market price will be accepted, as well as 
the demand bids offering prices higher than the market price. 
Depending on the demand, the last seller to trade, i.e. the one 
who establishes the market price, may not be able to negotiate 
all of its available supply, trading only partially. This process 
is repeated for each trading period of the day. Figure 2 
illustrates the dispatch procedure of the symmetric pool. 
 
Figure 2. Symmetric pool, adapted from [6] 
The efficiency of this market pool depends on the number 
of participating players, as well as on their bids provision. 
Players submitting their bids in this type of market reveal the 







B. Asymmetric pool  
The asymmetric pool is exclusive to the submission of 
supply bids. In this type of pool, buyers do not submit their 
bids, only indicate an estimate of consumption. In this model 
the demand is considered inelastic, since it is assumed that 
buyers participating in it are willing to pay any price resulting 
from the market operation. In this market type, seller agents 
submit their bids and the market operator orders them from the 
lowest price to the highest. As for buyers, they only express 
their demand needs. Afterwards, the market operator accepts 
only the supply necessary to fulfil the demand. The price to be 
paid to all the accepted suppliers is determined by the last 
accepted bid, i.e. the market price. Figure 3 shows the dispatch 
procedure of the asymmetric pool, for each negotiation period. 
Market prices in this pool are highly influenced by the prices 
of sale bids and by the amount of demand. 
 
Figure 3. Asymmetric pool, adapted from [6] 
IV. PROPOSED RESERVE COSTS ALLOCATION MODEL  
Electrical customers play an essential role on needed 
reserve in the power system. Providing electrical demand of 
consumers and reliability of the power systems are two main 
reasons why reserve is needed. Hence, Demand Factors (DFs) 
of electrical consumers that are defined for the first time in [9] 
are considered in this paper, in order to express the 
corresponding reliability level of customers. Effects of 
electrical demand and Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS), 
as a reliability criteria, are considered in DF as in (1): 
 
(1) 
where Ljt represents the total load of consumer j in time t. 
Customers are classified into different groups based on their 
DFs as seen in (2). A total number of M groups is considered. 
In this case,  has the highest corresponding DF and 
lowest corresponding reliability level. Hence,  is 
defined as in (3), as a difference between  and . 
 (2) 
= -  (3) 
As highlighted, when more reserve is needed to maintain 
system’s reliability level, the reserve costs will be increased. 
This increment of reserve costs should be paid by customers 
who have their corresponding reliability level  higher 
than others. Therefore, the portion of electrical customers to 
pay the cost of reserve (RC) is achieved by (4). 
 
(4) 
As a result from this model, each customer who has higher 
 is allocated to pay more reserve costs. Moreover, 
electrical consumers who have highest DF are not in charge of 
paying reserve costs based on this proposed method. 
V. CASE STUDY 
This case study aims at assessing the envisaged energy and 
reserve market simulation, using the proposed reserve cost 
allocation model, through its integration in the MASCEM 
simulator. The case study considers the simulation of the day-
ahead electricity market of MIBEL, which is complemented 
by the intra-day market. In the following step, the reserve 
market is executed, considering an asymmetric auction, in 
which generators bid their available capacity for reserve and 
corresponding price. Considering the total expected energy 
non-supplied, the reserve cost is achieved from this market. 
The payment of this cost is then determined by the proposed 
reserve cost allocation model. 
In order to set up this market environment, a simulation 
scenario was generated using RealScen. The considered 
scenario concerns 48 market negotiating agents. The main 
decision factor for the simulated agents’ representation is the 
real players’ competitiveness, i.e. their bid prices’ 
approximation to the established electricity market price. The 
objective is to represent the electricity market environment, 
which includes hundreds of players negotiating in each 
negotiating period, in a reduced simulated scenario that 
reflects the reality in the fullest possible extent. In order to 
enable the simulator to represent the reality in a summarized 
way, the automatic data extraction tool has been used to gather 
data from the Iberian electricity market – MIBEL [19]. The 
simulated scenarios refer to the 24 hourly periods of the day-
ahead spot market, in one negotiating day – June, 1st 2012. 
The simulated agents consider the log of real players’ bids to 
the market during this day, in order to create their own action 
portfolio in the market. Figure 4 shows the electricity market 
price and total amount of transacted and non-transacted energy 
in the day-ahead spot market simulation, during the 24 hourly 
periods of the considered simulation day. 
 







From Figure 4 it is visible that the day-ahead market prices 
in the considered day range from 44 €/MWh to 66 €/MWh. It 
is also visible that most of the available energy has been 
transacted, with the exception of 4 periods. One of these is 
period 20, for which Figure 5 shows some details, namely 
referring to the demand and supply bid curves, which are 
composed by the price and volume offers made by the 
participating agents. 
 
Figure 5. Day-ahead spot market bid curves for period 20 
From Figure 5 one can see that the point where the 
demand and supply curves intersect in this period corresponds 
to the price of 55,03 €/MWh – the established market price for 
this period. It is also visible that some supply is not 
dispatched, namely the amount that is associated to prices 
higher than the market price. 
Departing from the day-ahead spot market results and 
considering the variations in expected consumption and 
generation from the previous day towards the delivery time, 
the intra-day market is executed. This market, according to the 
MIBEL rules [19], considers 6 market sessions, which cover 
all the periods of the delivery day, and which are executed in 
different time horizons. Based on the results of the intra-day 
market and on the individual strategies and goals, generators 
submit their bids to the reserve market, which are composed 
by the volume of energy that is available for reserve, and the 
associated price. In this case, the market runs as an 
asymmetric auction, considering only the bids from 
generators. The reserve market price is established depending 
on the amount of reserve that is required. Figure 6 shows the 
supply bid curve for the asymmetric reserve market auction, 
still referring to hourly period 20. 
 
Figure 6. Reserve market supply bid curve for period 20 
 
TABLE I. RESERVE COSTS ALLOCATION RESULTS 
Consumer LOAD (MWh) ENS (MWh) DF ∆DF Group RC (€) 
Buyer 1 1,3 1,3 1 0 1 0 
Buyer 2 64,7 4,3 0,066461 0,933539 8 256,6547446 
Buyer 3 3,2 3,2 1 0 1 0 
Buyer 4 485 12,3 0,025361 0,974639 14 267,9541594 
Buyer 5 1,2 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 6 3,1 0,4 0,129032 0,870968 3 239,4521327 
Buyer 7 1,4 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 8 0,1 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 9 3,7 0,6 0,162162 0,837838 2 230,3438434 
Buyer 10 0,4 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 11 0,1 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 12 433,7 21,3 0,049112 0,950888 10 261,4242517 
Buyer 13 336,8 16,7 0,049584 0,950416 9 261,2944772 
Buyer 14 18,6 2,3 0,123656 0,876344 4 240,9302323 
Buyer 15 119,7 4,6 0,038429 0,961571 12 264,3612595 
Buyer 16 10,4 1,2 0,115385 0,884615 5 243,2042316 
Buyer 17 129,3 8,7 0,067285 0,932715 7 256,4279864 
Buyer 18 0,4 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 19 51,9 1,6 0,030829 0,969171 13 266,4509459 
Buyer 20 33,3 1,4 0,042042 0,957958 11 263,3680503 
Buyer 21 9,6 1,1 0,114583 0,885417 6 243,4245253 
Buyer 22 3,1 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 
Buyer 23 0,9 0 0 1 15 274,9265227 







Figure 6 shows the bids that have been submitted to the 
reserve market by the several generators. The total energy no-
supplied in this scenario has been of 81MWh. From Figure 6 it 
is possible to verify that this volume represents a reserve 
market price of 71,23 €/MWh, which leads to a total reserve 
cost of 5769,63 € in this period.  The proposed reserve costs 
allocation model is applied to determine who should pay for 
this reserve cost. Table I shows the results from the reserve 
costs allocation model, considering M=15.  
As seen in Table I, reserve cost is allocated between 
consumers based on the proposed method. In this way, 
consumers 1 and 3 have their DF equal to one, and are 
therefore not responsible for paying reserve costs. Also, their 
 is equal to zero. Table I shows that customers should 
pay more reserve costs when they have higher . Hence, 
in this case study, the allocated reserve costs related to 
consumers 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18, 22, 23 and 24 is highest 
because their corresponding  has the highest amount in 
the system. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper addresses the simulation of energy and reserve 
markets, using a proposed model for reserve costs allocation 
as means to distribute the reserve costs that result from the 
market negotiations. Results from a case study based on real 
data from MIBEL, simulated using MASCEM, show that the 
proposed reserve costs allocation model enables distributing 
the reserve costs among the most appropriate consumers, in 
order to guarantee the payment for the reserve that is 
negotiated in the reserve market. The presented simulations 
also enable considering the proposed approach as a promising 
solution for the evolution of electricity markets.  
Future work will consider alternative models for reserve 
costs allocation, as well as the assessment of other possible 
solutions for reserve market mechanisms, in order to smooth 
the connection with the current day-ahead, intra-day and 
balancing market models. 
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